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for high-capital, low variable cost manufacturing to enter.  We test the model against the history 
of the rodeo kayak industry and find it supported.  We discuss implications for “dominant 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
It has been shown that many users – both individuals and firms - develop new products 
to serve their own needs.  Some of these are later adopted by manufacturers and sold as 
commercial products. Thus user innovation can greatly influence the rate and direction of 
innovation in some industries.  In this paper we explore the pathways commonly traversed as 
user innovations are transformed into commercial products. We construct a model, based on 
design search theory, that explains first, how user innovation is organized and evolves over time, 
and second, how user innovations become products and affect the evolution of product markets.   
There is an extensive literature on how changes in product design and production technology 
affect the organization of industry. This paper brings user innovation into that line of research. 
According to the theory developed in this paper, user innovation begins when one or 
more users of some good recognize a new set of design possibilities– a so-called “design space” –
and begin to explore it.  In general, one or more communities of user-innovators will soon coalesce 
and begin to exchange innovation-related information. We use the formal theory of design search 
to model the behavior of user-innovators and the benefits they obtain by forming communities. 
Some time after user innovation begins, the first user-purchasers appear – these are users who 
want to buy the goods that embody the lead user innovations rather than building them for 
themselves.  Manufacturers emerge in response to this demand. We show that, under quite 
general conditions, the first manufacturers to enter the market  are likely to be user-innovators 
who use the same flexible, high-variable-cost, low-capital production technologies they use to 
build their own prototypes. The relatively high variable costs of these user-manufacturers will tend 
to limit the size of the market. 
As information about product designs becomes codified, and as market volumes grow, 
manufacturers—both existing user-manufacturers and established manufacturers from other 
fields—can justify investing in higher-volume production processes involving higher capital 
investments.  These processes have lower variable costs, hence their use will tend to drive prices 
lower and expand the market. User-purchasers then have a choice between lower-cost 
standardized goods and higher-cost, more advanced models that user-innovators continue to 
develop.  We predict that the market will segment along the lines of consumer preferences: we 
model that segmentation as a function of design quality, usability, and cost.  Finally, as a design 
space matures, the rate of user innovation within that space tends to decline because the expected 
returns from further design improvements decrease. We model the effects of this “mining out” of 
the design space on the manufacturers’ choice of technology and capital investment. 
We begin this paper with a literature review (section 2), followed by a case history of 
rodeo kayaking (section 3).  This case history serves as the “test case” in the development of our 
theory.  In section 4, we define the basic concepts and terms of our model.  In section 5, we 
explore the decision-making and organization of user-innovators.  Next, we consider the 
economics of manufacturing as user innovation and investment in production technologies change 
the nature of products and demand (section 6). Section 7 concludes by discussing the theoretical 
and managerial implications of our findings. 
 
2. Literature review 
In this section, we first review research on innovation by users and within user 
innovation communities.  Next, we describe what is known about the role of user-innovators in 
commercializing the innovations they have developed.  Finally, we review prior work on how 
industry structures change in response to changes in underlying product designs and production 
technologies.  
 
Innovation by users 
Research has shown that some of the most important and novel products and processes 
have been developed by users - both user firms and individual end users. Thus, Enos (1962) 
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reported that nearly all the most important innovations in oil refining were developed by user 
firms (oil refineries). Freeman (1968) found that the most widely licensed chemical production 
processes were developed by user firms. Von Hippel (1988) found that users were the developers 
of about 80 percent of the most important scientific instrument innovations, and also the 
developers of most of the major innovations in semiconductor processing. Pavitt (1984) found 
that many inventions by British firms were for in-house use. Shah (2000) found that the most 
commercially important equipment innovations in four sporting fields tended to be developed by 
individual users.  It has also been found that commercially attractive products tend to be 
developed by “lead users” – users that are at the leading edge of important marketplace trends 
and expect significant benefit from innovating  (Urban and von Hippel 1988, Morrison et al. 2002, 
Franke, von Hippel and Schreier 2005, Olson and Bakke 2001). 
Studies have also shown that many users engage in developing or modifying products.  
In studies of five types of industrial products, the fraction of users reporting developing or 
modifying products for their own use ranged from 19% to 36% (Urban and von Hippel 1988, 
Herstatt and von Hippel 1992, Morrison et al. 2000, Franke and von Hippel 2003, Lüthje 2003a).  
Three studies of user innovation in consumer products found from 10% to 38% of sampled users 
reporting that they had developed or modified products for their own use (Lüthje 2003b, Franke 
and Shah 2003, Lüthje et al. 2003).  Users with similar interests and needs often form user 
innovation communities, where members freely reveal their innovations and assist each other 
with innovation development (Franke and Shah 2002, Hienerth 2004).  
 
Entrepreneurship by users 
While it is clear that many users innovate and that user-innovation communities are 
common, the evidence on the role of user-innovators in the commercialization of their innovations is 
mixed. On the one hand, von Hippel (1988) found that individual scientists who had developed 
important scientific instrument innovations seldom founded firms to exploit these. He also found that 
user firms that had developed new process equipment seldom went into the commercial production 
of this equipment.  In contrast, Shah (2000) found that, in the field of sporting equipment, lead users 
who developed significant equipment innovations often did become user-manufacturers, producing 
small volumes of their innovative equipment for purchasers.  Some of these small-scale “lifestyle” 
firms faded away as larger firms entered the market.  Others, however, grew into major 
manufacturers their own right. (For example, Burton Snowboards, founded by an innovating user, 
has become a major manufacturer of snowboarding equipment).  Lettl et al (2005) found that 
innovating users in the medical equipment field often played important roles in the 
commercialization of their innovations that fell short of actually starting a company (e.g., helping to 
find funding or serving as consultants). 
Shah and Tripsas (2004) explore when user-innovators are likely to start firms, and 
compare the competitive advantages of user-startups with established manufacturers. They point 
out that the likelihood that users will start companies is affected by their opportunity costs.  
Specifically, the (generally jobless) sports participants who started “lifestyle firms” in Shah’s 
study had less to lose by starting a company than did the scientists studied by von Hippel.  Shah 
and Tripsas go on to argue that, in terms of resources and capabilities, user-manufacturers have 
natural information advantages with respect to user needs and desires; they also may obtain free 
assistance from members of their communities. For their part, established manufacturers may 
have complementary resources in the form of distribution channels, established brands, and 
existing manufacturing facilities. 
 
The shift to larger-scale manufacturing  
We are not aware of any previous theoretical investigations of how user innovations 
become commercial products. However, there is an extensive literature on how innovation (by 
firms not users) affects the organization of industry.  Modern studies of industry evolution were 
initiated by Utterback and Abernathy (1975).  They put forward the idea that innovation in an 
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“industry segment” begins with product innovation.  Many manufacturers, they said, enter the 
new segment and compete by offering different product alternatives. Eventually, a “dominant 
product design” is selected by competition in the marketplace.  Thereafter, product innovation 
declines and process innovation specific to the dominant design becomes a more worthwhile 
investment.  Returns to scale in manufacturing then drive a shift towards increasing industry 
concentration, and eventually only a few manufacturers with large market shares survive.  
The dominant design conjecture has spawned a significant body of empirical research: 
see Murmann and Frenken (2005) for an analytic overview of this literature.  Despite its 
fruitfulness, the dominant design construct has been criticized for its ambiguity and its 
dependence on post hoc appraisals (one cannot know a design is “dominant” until it succeeds).  In 
addition, Klepper (1996) has pointed out that a dominant design is not required for a shift from 
product to process innovation to occur in an industry. As unit production volumes for specific 
models increase, investments in process innovation will become steadily more attractive whether 
or not a dominant design exists. 
 Using evidence from the computer industry, Baldwin and Clark (2000) have argued that 
changes in the modular structure of both product and process designs can cause changes in 
industry structure via two mechanisms. First, modularizations split up “design spaces” in ways 
that increase their overall option value. Higher option value justifies more design searches, which 
in turn create conditions favorable to entry by new firms.  Second, modularizations create new 
“technologically separable interfaces” where transactions between firms can be located.  (The 
term “technologically separable interface” is due to Williamson (1985). Arora et al. (2001) make a 
similar argument.)  Thus modularizations create conditions favorable to vertical disintegration 
and the formation of so-called “modular clusters.” In complementary work based on the 
mortgage banking industry, Jacobides and Winter (2005) have argued that, once technologically 
separable interfaces exist in a supply chain, heterogeneous capabilities across firms in each layer 
will create “gains from trade.” Over time, exploiting the gains from trade leads to vertical 
disintegration. However, as this process unfolds, the knowledge relevant to production may 
become too compartmentalized, which then creates incentives for firms to reintegrate their 
operations.  
The main difference between Abernathy and Utterback’s and Klepper’s theories on the 
one hand, and the theories of Baldwin and Clark and Jacobides and Winter on the other, is that 
the latter focus on the determinants of vertical as well as horizontal industry structure. In the 
latter cases, as long as the overall product and process architecture is stable, in each subindustry 
of a modular cluster or stage of a supply chain, the dynamics posited by Abernathy and 
Utterback and Klepper can take place. In this paper, we take a Baldwin and Clark design theory 
perspective, but leave out the possibility of modularization. Instead we posit that a new “design 
space” can be opened up and initially explored by users.  (The concept of a design space is 
explained in section 5 below.)  
 
3. Rodeo kayaking—a sport and industry driven by user innovation 
When building a theory about complex and inter-related phenomena like innovation and 
industry evolution, the first task is to construct a model of cause and effect that can explain one 
set of events in a satisfactory manner. Those events—a case history—serve as the first true test of 
the theory. A theory that cannot explain its test case has been refuted ab initio. In contrast, a 
theory that can explain its test case has cleared one hurdle, and merits further testing and 
refinement. 
In a test case it is helpful if the essential patterns stand out and are not obscured by other, 
potentially conflicting data.  Rodeo kayaking—which is both a sport and an industry—satisfies 
this criterion.  The phenomena of interest in this paper are user innovation and product 
migration from user-innovators to commercial manufacturers.  As we will see, the history of 
rodeo kayaking has been dominated by user innovation for thirty years.  During this time period, 
many innovations by users have become commercial products.  Hienerth (2004) has described the 
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evolution of the rodeo kayaking and the industry from inception in the 1970’s to 2002.  We next 
draw upon his account to summarize the features of that history that are critical to testing our 
theory and models. 
Rodeo kayaking involves using specialized kayaks to perform acrobatic “moves” or 
“tricks” such as spins and flips in rough whitewater. Interest in the sport has grown significantly 
over the years. In the mid-1970’s whitewater kayaking “enthusiasts” (frequent participants) in the 
U.S. numbered about 5,000 individuals (Taft 2001).  By 2002, about 435,000 enthusiasts in the U.S. 
took more than five trips per year (Outdoor Industry Association 2004). A similar, but uncounted 
number of enthusiasts live outside of the U.S., primarily in Europe. Approximately 50,000 rodeo 
kayaks were purchased in 2002.  Industry revenue is currently about $100 million per year 
including necessary accessories specifically designed for the sport such as paddles and helmets.1  
Rodeo kayaking began when, between 1968 and 1970, an avid kayaker named Walt 
Blackader began to evolve methods of entering waves sideways or backwards. Soon, other 
“extreme paddlers” joined him and formed a small community.  User-innovators in the 
community began to build their own specialized kayaks and related gear and safety equipment.  
They built their rodeo kayak prototypes from fiberglass using hand lay-up techniques – a method 
also used by the manufacturers of commercial alpine kayaks at that time.  The method was labor 
intensive but required very little capital. 
 In the early 1970’s rodeo kayak manufacturing began when some user-innovators began 
to respond to requests from potential purchasers who asked, “can you make me a kayak of the 
same design as the one you built for yourself?”  These first “user-manufacturers” used the same 
low capital, high variable cost hand lay-up techniques to produce boats for sale that they used to 
build boats for their own use.   
 In the mid-1970’s two manufacturers already established in the plastics forming business, 
Uniroyal and Hollowform, identified plastic-hull rodeo kayaks as a potentially profitable market 
opportunity. They introduced boats based on user designs of that time, but made entirely of 
plastic (Taft 2001, telephone interview, 2005).  Plastic boats could be produced at low variable 
cost, but required higher capital investment than traditional production methods in the form of 
relatively expensive, design-specific molds.   
 The introduction of plastic rodeo kayaks was associated with a great expansion of the 
market: plastic kayaks were less expensive and much more durable than fiberglass kayaks.  Many 
customers who had not started whitewater kayaking because they did not want to spend their 
leisure time repairing kayaks now bought plastic boats. Also, paddlers could run steeper and 
more dangerous rivers than before  (Taft 2001).   Some of the original user-manufacturers 
switched to plastic boat manufacturing, but others stayed focused on the production of fiberglass 
boats for specific market segments (e.g., slalom, competition).  
 In the 1980’s most rodeo kayakers used commercially-manufactured plastic boats.  But 
plastic boats did not become a platform for user-innovators, because their hulls could not be 
easily modified.  User-innovators, therefore, built their novel designs using traditional fiberglass 
lay-up techniques.  User innovation in the early and mid 1980’s focused on the development of 
“squirt boat” kayak hull designs. Squirt boats were designed to have only 51% buoyancy – e.g. if 
one added more than 1% additional weight, the boats would sink rather than float. Each boat 
therefore had to be tailored to the body-weight of the paddler. The advantage of low buoyancy 
was that a kayaker could simply lean forward or backwards to push the bow or stern of the boat 
under the surface of the water.  As a result, kayakers were able to do existing tricks better, and 
were also able to do new tricks such as cartwheeling for the first time. But although squirt boats 
were very appealing to highly skilled paddlers, their low buoyancy and tight dimensions made 
them dangerous and uncomfortable for most kayakers.  Only a few thousand squirt boats were 
                                                          
1 Colman (1998) . Telephone interviews with Eric Jackson  of Jackson Kayak (April 2005) and Robert Sommer 
of Mega Sports GmbH (October 2004) were used to update the figures. 
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made, produced by users for themselves or by user-manufacturers using low-capital fiberglass 
hand lay-up techniques. 
 In the late 1980’s, user-innovators discovered how to have the “best of both worlds,” in 
the form of reasonable buoyancy plus the high maneuverability of the squirt boat. Their 
fundamental innovation was to reduce buoyancy at the ends of the boat while increasing it in the 
middle. The net effect was a buoyant boat with a bow and stern that could still be easily pushed 
under the water during execution of a trick. In addition, user-innovators discovered that by 
building a very flat hull, a planing hull, they could easily spin and maneuver in whitewater.  
User-innovator communities quickly focused on this new type of boat. Hull designs and new 
tricks and techniques developed very rapidly, each responding to the other. Flashier tricks on 
steeper and more dangerous runs brought media attention to the sport and a growing number of 
people tried out rodeo kayaking. 
 The new, “center-buoyant” planing hull designs evoked enough demand to justify new 
rounds of investment in the molds for plastic boats. Indeed, a number of new manufacturers 
entered the industry in the late 1980s and the 1990s in order to satisfy this demand. And while 
large-scale manufacturers had traditionally changed their designs only every four to five years, in 
the late 1990s, companies started to change designs on a one or two-year cycle.  Around 2000 a 
fairly standard rodeo kayak design emerged, and the rate of both user innovation and new model 
introduction by manufacturers decreased. However, the new standard design greatly increased 
the demand for rodeo kayaks among both competitive and amateur paddlers. 
 
Rodeo Kayak Innovations 
 As indicated, because our theory and models focus on how user innovations become 
commercial products, we wanted user innovation to be the dominant source of innovation in our 
test case industry. To verify that this was the case, we compiled a dataset of all innovations in 
techniques and equipment that were important to the evolution of rodeo kayaking between 1970 
and 2000. As can be seen in Table 1, we divided the innovations into major and minor categories. 
Major technique innovations are defined as major tricks that have been assigned performance 
points by the International Freestyle Committee (IFC) in rodeo competitions; minor technique 
innovations are recognized improvements of major techniques.   For example, performing 
multiple cartwheels in a kayak is a major technique innovation, while transferring one’s body 
weight from one side to another to change the direction of a multiple cartwheel (splitwheel) is a 
related, minor technique innovation.  Major equipment innovations are defined as those that 
changed the way in which people used and paddled rodeo kayaks in a significant way;  minor 
equipment improvements improved the new functionality achieved by these major 
improvements or made paddling more efficient and comfortable.  For example, the flat planing 
hull was a major equipment innovation, while “divot” indentations to reduce water friction were 
a related, minor innovation. 
 
Table 1: Sources of Rodeo Kayaking Innovations 
 
 Source of Innovations 
Innovation Type User User-Manufacturer Manufacturer Number 
Technique Innovations     
Major 100% - - 6 
Minor 100% - - 33 
Hardware Innovations     
Major 63% 13% 25% 8 
Minor 83% 2% 15% 46 
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We also determined the source of each innovation, and coded the source as either user, 
user-manufacturer or manufacturer.  (These terms are precisely defined in section 4, below.) The 
results  are summarized in table 1. The full dataset is available from the authors or on the web at 
http://designresearch.jot.com/RodeoKayakInnovations.  
Table 1 shows that users developed 100% of all new techniques, as well as 62% of the 
major and 83% of the minor equipment innovations in rodeo kayaking. In other words, for thirty 
years, users have been the dominant innovators in this field. We concluded that the rodeo kayaking 
industry was an appropriate test case to use in constructing a model of how user innovations 
become commercial products. 
 
4. Set-up for the model 
Our goal in modeling is to explore and characterize the process by which innovations 
initiated by user-innovators become commercial products. In our model we assume that all 
innovations come from users – a good fit, as we have seen, to the facts for our rodeo kayak test 
case.  The primary actors in our model are user-innovators, user-purchasers, user-manufacturers 
and established manufacturers from other industries.   
User-innovators seek to develop new designs for their own personal use or (in the case of 
user firms) internal corporate benefit. They do not anticipate selling goods or services based on 
their innovations, although they may later go into business as user-manufacturers (see below). 
Designing for use and testing by use are the essential characteristics of user-innovators: they may 
subcontract production and parts supply, but they cannot subcontract the innovation’s design or 
testing and be user-innovators under our definition. 
User-purchasers are satisfied to use an existing design, although they may wish to use an 
innovative or advanced model. They do not want to innovate or produce the good themselves, 
but they will pay money to acquire it. User-manufacturers are user-innovators who make copies of 
their designs and sell them to user-purchasers. In our field observations and those of Shah (2003), 
user-manufacturers are often the first to enter a new marketplace with a new product. This is one 
of the empirical observations our model explains (see section 5 below).  
Established manufacturers are already in business in some other arena. As a result, they 
may have complementary assets such as manufacturing capacity, distribution channels and 
brands. They acquire designs from user-innovators by purchasing them, licensing them or simply 
copying them. (Note that our list of actors does not include “pure” entrepreneurs, that is, non-
users who innovate and start new firms. This is consistent with our theoretical focus on user 
innovation.) 
In the next two sections (5 and 6), we will develop our model along two “tracks.” Section 
5 deals with the decisions and actions of user-innovators, while section 6 deals with the decisions 
and actions of user- and established manufacturers as user-generated innovations arrive. 
 
5. The Search for New Designs by User-Innovators 
Characteristics of New Designs 
Every innovation involves a new design, and designs have certain essential properties 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2006a). First, designing requires effort, hence new designs are costly. Second, 
design outcomes are uncertain in several ways. The behavior of a newly designed good and the 
reaction of users to that behavior are not perfectly predictable. The costliness and uncertainty of 
new designs in turn can be formalized by modeling the process of design as a search in an 
unknown territory. (Simon 1981, Nelson and Winter 1977, Levinthal 1997, Baldwin and Clark 
2000, Rivkin 2000, Loch et. al. 2001).  
A design space is the name given to the abstract territory in which design search takes 
place. Speaking informally, a design space includes all possible variants in the design of a class of 
artifact—such as a rodeo kayak. The design of a particular thing corresponds to a single point in 
the design space. For example, a red kayak and a blue kayak with the same hull design are two 
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points in the kayak design space. Their designs differ on a single dimension—color. (Bell and 
Newell 1971, Shaw and Garlan 1996, Baldwin and Clark 2000, Murmann and Frenken 2005.) 
The following sequence of events takes place in a new design space. First, the new space 
opens up. Then user-innovators search in this space for new and better designs. As they search, 
the design space gets “mapped,” that is, the searchers come to understand the properties of a 
large number of design alternatives. Eventually, the design space may be “mined out,” and 
search in that space will stop.  (Our assumption that the relevant design space is finite and so can 
be mined out holds up well in the case of rodeo kayaking, as we will show below.  Sometimes, 
however, innovators exploring a design space may decide to alter or expand the space as they 
explore.  We will return to the issue of the limits of design spaces at the end of the paper.) 
User-innovators are motivated to explore a design space because they believe that new 
designs in the space can enhance the things they do. Thus no one has to pay users to search in the 
design space. This is a critical property of user innovation in general: up to a certain point 
(described below), design searches by user-innovators are motivated by the users’ own desires 
for a better product.  
Every new design is an option. Technically an option is “the right but not the obligation” 
to take a particular action (Merton 1998). When a new design is created, users can accept it or 
reject it. They have “the right but not the obligation” to solve some problem in a new way. 
Uncertainty combined with optionality justifies investment in multiple design searches, that is, 
the prototyping and testing of many new designs. Uncertainty also results in a dispersion of 
outcomes, but optionality implies that only the best of those results will survive (Baldwin and 
Clark 2000).  
 The last important property of designs is non-rivalry. The use of a design by one person 
does not preclude another from using it too. Thus designs cannot be “consumed” in the sense of 
being “used up.”  Of course property rights, e.g. patents or copyrights, can turn designs into rival 
goods: rights owners can prevent others from using their design.  However, property rights are a 
feature of specific institutional regimes, not an intrinsic characteristic of designs. 
 
The Opening of a New Design Space and Search by Isolated User-Innovators 
The “opening” of a new design space is often a datable event—like the time that Walt 
Blackader first used a kayak to do tricks in the whitewater of a river. As in this case, user-
innovators may trigger the opening by doing something in a new way. But researchers can also 
open up new design spaces, as Shockley did for the transistor, and Kilby and Noyce for 
integrated circuits. 
For simplicity, we assume that the designs in a particular space can be ranked, and that 
all users will agree on the ranking. In that case, at any time, there will be one best design, and 
everyone will agree on what it is. Let the quality of the best pre-existing design by user-innovator 
  i  be   ai . We can assume that all the  ai s are zero when the new design space opens. Then, as the 
innovators search, their designs will improve, and each innovator’s  ai  will get higher and higher. 
By the optionality of designs, any innovator can always fall back on a previous design, thus  ai  
never decreases. 
Innovators also have expectations about the quality of the new designs they may find if 
they make the effort to search. Design outcomes, we have said, are uncertain, hence these beliefs 
are probabilisitic. We model them as a random variable,  X , whose support is a measure of design 
quality or value. For simplicity, we assume that all innovators perceive  X  in the same way, and 
that each new design search generates an independent draw from the distribution of   X . (Our 
qualitative results do not change if design search outcomes are correlated, although the notation 
becomes more complicated.) 
Each user-innovator also has a cost of search,  di . This is his perception of the time, effort 
and money it will take to develop one new prototype for his own use. The innovator can compare 
this number to the quality of prototypes already in existence and to his expectation of the quality 
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of future designs.  
Suppose each user-innovator is completely isolated from all others. Each would then 
have access to her own best previous design but no one else’s. We assume that the innovator 
looks at her old design (  ai ); thinks about potential new designs (  X ); and the cost of her time and 
effort (  di ).  Investing time and effort in a new design is worthwhile if: 
 
  Pr( X > ai )[E(X | X > ai ) − ai] − di > 0  ;   (1) 
 
 Reward conditional                  Cost of 
 on success of search                  Search 
where: 
  Pr( X > ai )   is the probability that the new (uncertain) design will be better 
than the old one; 
 
  E(X | X > ai ) − ai   is the expected value of the new design, given that it is better, 
minus the value of the old design. 
  
The left-hand side of expression (1) is well-known in option theory: it is the expected 
payoff (net of cost) to a call option. The “strike price” of this option is  ai , the value of the best 
pre-existing design. The cost of purchasing the option is  di . It is well-known and intuitive that as 
  ai  increases, the value of the option declines (weakly). (Merton, 1990, pp 262-263.) Thus for any 
innovator, as the value of her best pre-existing design rises, the “net option value” of search will 
decline. At some point, the user-innovator will perceive the incremental expected benefit of 
further search to be less than her opportunity cost, and will stop trying to generate new designs. 
Implicitly then there is a “threshold value,”  ai *, that makes expression (1) equal to zero: 
 
  Pr( X > ai *)[E(X | X > ai *)− ai *] − di = 0    .    (2) 
 
Each user-innovator will continue to search until he finds a design that is better than his 
threshold.  In general, the threshold value  ai * will differ from person to person (or firm to firm), 
depending on their perceptions of the design space and their cost of search.  Note also that the 
innovators’ calculations do not have to be formal: they need only have a sense of the value of 
their own time, the utility of their own best pre-existing design, and the degree of difficulty of 
design improvement. 
 
Search in a Community of User-Innovators 
The second event in the “user innovation track” of our model is the transition from 
isolated user-innovators to a community of user-innovators who freely exchange information on 
their designs in real-time. By real-time, we mean that designers learn of other designs in time to 
influence their decisions to search or not on the next round.  Real-time communication coupled 
with free-revealing of new designs has been observed in communities of sports enthusiasts 
(Franke and Shah 2003, Hienerth, 2004); in open source development communities (Raymond 
1999, Henkel, 2005), among firms using similar production equipment and processes (Allen 1983, 
Nuvolari, 2004), and many other settings (Shah, in press). In rodeo kayaking communities, for 
example, communication and free-revealing are achieved via frequent joint excursions by 
members, during which the performance of any innovations can be observed, and the 
innovations themselves are examined in detail by all who are interested. 
More formally, let the previously isolated user-innovators form a community in which 
they freely reveal their designs. Let  ′ a  denote the value of the best of all pre-existing designs at a 
given time: 
  
′ a ≡ max
i
{ai }. We assume that any member of the community can use this design if he 
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or she wishes to do so. For the moment, assume that all members have the same search costs. 
Each member’s expected benefit from searching is then: 
 
  Pr( X > ′ a )[E(X | X > ′ a ) − ′ a ] − d       (3) 
 
This expression is identical in form to expression (1) above—it is the expected payoff to a call 
option. The option price is the same, but the strike price is now  ′ a , the value of the community’s 
best pre-existing design, which is the maximum of all the individuals’ best designs. 
The first result of the model is that search redundancy is reduced within communities.  
Working separately, all user-innovators will get to designs with value above their personal  ai *, 
but they will do so redundantly. For example, suppose by luck one of the designers achieved a 
design above everyone’s threshold on the first trial. If all the others knew about that new design 
and could use it, they would stop searching. But, if they are isolated, they will keep on searching, 
each on his or her own narrow trajectory.  
Let us assume that there are  K  user-innovators in total and that all have the same 
threshold value,   a *. Let   S * denote the average number of searches needed to surpass the 
threshold. Then, in expectation, isolated user-innovators will conduct  KS * searches, while user-
innovators in the community will conduct only  S * searches. 
The second result of the model is that all community members will benefit from the 
findings of those who search longest. To see this, suppose the community is made up of 
heterogeneous individuals. Some may have higher or lower search costs; some may have 
different perceptions of the probability of achieving a better design. As a result, the individual 
user-innovators’ thresholds,   ai *, will vary. Let  ′ ′ a  denote the maximum of all the individual 
thresholds: 
 
  
′ ′ a ≡ max
i
{ai *}   .        (4) 
 
Search in the community will continue until this threshold is surpassed.  
To summarize, a community consisting of  K  user-innovators confers two benefits on its 
members. First, any given threshold of performance can be attained at a search cost that is on 
average   1/ K  of  the average search cost of individuals in isolation. Second, community search 
will continue until the best design exceeds the maximum threshold of all members. Thus, when 
the search process ends, all members but one will have access to a design that is better than the 
one they would have settled for had they been searching alone. 
These results do not speak to the distribution of benefits and costs among members of the 
community. One possible distribution is for one individual to do all the innovating, and for all 
other members to free-ride. In this case, the lone innovator is no better off in the community than 
if he were searching in isolation. But given any other distribution of search effort, all members of the 
community are better off in it than outside of it  (Baldwin and Clark 2006b). A similar principle 
applies to mergers of communities: as long as the distribution of effort is not one-sided, then 
members of two smaller communities will always benefit by joining forces to form a larger 
community. 
 The “pro-community” results of our model arise because of the non-rival property of 
designs. If rivalry between user-innovators increases, the benefits of free-revealing and of 
forming communities will go down. Rivalry can increase through several mechanisms, some of 
which can be seen operating in present-day rodeo kayaking communities (Hienerth 2004).   First, 
if users within a community compete with each other, willingness to freely reveal performance-
enhancing innovations will be reduced (Franke and Shah 2003).  Second, if user-innovators 
become user-manufacturers (or affiliated with established manufacturers) and compete for the 
same customers, they will perforce become rivals, and their incentives to share design 
information in a community will go down. (Henkel 2005; Baldwin and Clark 2006b). 
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 As an illustration of the latter effect, consider the history of the Home Brew Computer 
Club.  This club was initially formed by hobbyists in the San Francisco Bay area who were 
interested in developing and improving personal computers for their own use.  It flourished for a 
number of years as members developed and freely shared important advances in that field.  
Later, when some club members formed companies (for example, Steven Jobs and Stephen 
Wozniak formed Apple Computer), information flow among the membership decreased, and 
eventually the club disbanded (Freiberger and Swaine 1999). 
 
The “Mining Out” of a Design Space 
We define a successful new design as one that is better than the best previous design. 
Thus if   ′ a  is the community’s best design so far, a successful new design is one whose realization 
is greater than   ′ a .  For a fixed random variable,  X , the probability that the next design is better 
than the previous best is a (weakly) declining function of  ′ a . Intuitively, the better the best 
previous design, the lower is the probability of surpassing it. This means that, if the community 
of user-innovators conducts the same number of searches per period, the expected time between 
successful new designs, denoted   T , will tend to increase over time. Indeed, this expected interarrival 
time will go up each time a successful new design is found. (See the Appendix 1 for a proof. In 
Section 6 we will show that the expected interarrival time between successful user innovations is 
of crucial importance to established manufacturers contemplating entry.) 
Thus our model predicts that the rate of increase in performance of a given set of 
innovations (drawn from the same design space) will decline over time even with a constant level 
of search effort.  In the case of rodeo kayaking, the effects of design search and of “mining out” a 
design space can be seen by plotting maximum scores attained by participants in rodeo kayak 
championships against time, as shown in Figure 1. (Scoring methods for rodeo kayaking 
championships are established by the International Freestyle Committee. They remained 
basically the same from 1985 to 2005, although scores for new tricks were added as new 
techniques were invented. Thus the changes in maximum scores reflect year-over-year 
improvements in the best techniques and equipment.) From 1985 to 2002, as the figure shows, 
there were consistent improvements in the maximum scores. By 2002, however, the possibilities 
for improvement were largely exhausted and since then maximum scores have bounced around 
an average of about 500 points.   
  
Figure 1: Maximum performance scores by individual participants in rodeo 
kayaking championships, 1985-2005 
 
Score improvement actually took place in two discrete stages. Before 1997, rodeo 
kayaking competition involved tricks performed in whitewater “holes.” In 1997, experts in the 
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sport agreed that were few opportunities for performance improvement; as a result the world 
championships were shifted to sites that offered standing waves as well as holes. This change 
opened up new scoring possibilities and, as the chart shows, maximum scores increased 
dramatically in 1999, 2001 and 2002. In our terminology, the inclusion of standing waves 
augmented, that is, added new dimensions the searchable design space of techniques. 
A second prediction of our model is that, other things equal, total search effort by user-
innovators will tend to decline over time. Intuitively, as each user-innovator crosses his 
performance threshold,   ai *, the expected improvement in the design will no longer exceed that 
person’s perceived value of time, effort and expense, and he will stop attempting to innovate. 
Although data are sparse, some evidence of this pattern can be seen in rodeo kayaking. In the 
early 1970s, around half the kayaks made were designed and produced by users in local clubs 
(Taft, 2001, p. 165). There were no national, much less international communities: user-innovators 
basically searched in isolation. Then with the introduction of molded plastic kayaks, the number 
of active user-innovators declined (although the total number of users went up). Plastic kayaks 
were very difficult to modify, and thus, in terms of our model, plastic kayak users faced very 
high design costs (high   di ).  
 From 1980 to 1985 leading-edge users started designing and building fiberglass squirt 
boats – first only a few, then increasing to around 1,000 in 1985 (Snyder 2005).  These boats had to 
be customized to each user, hence there was necessarily a lot of experimentation with design 
modifications. However, with the introduction of center-buoyant, planing hull designs in the 
1990s, the number of people designing their own kayaks decreased again. According to Eric 
Jackson (2005), a two-time world champion and founder of Jackson Kayaks, starting in the 1990s, 
the number of people working on their own boats came down. By 2000, he estimated, there were 
only a few hundred people actively working on new hull designs.  This is less than .1% of all 
users - estimated at 3.9 million in 2002 by the Outdoor Industry Association (2004).   These active 
user-innovators typically work on designs for fun and to increase performance for high-level 
competition. (About 400 people compete at the world level every year. The theory of tournaments 
applied to design search predicts that competitors may continue to search long after other users 
have stopped (Aoki 2001).) 
In sum, our theory views user-innovators as economic actors who perceive their time and 
effort to be valuable and respond rationally to changing incentives. As the options in a given 
design space are mined out, such user-innovators will be less inclined to search in that space. 
Although we lack hard quantitative evidence, our interviewees perceive that user innovation 
(particularly in hull design) has declined over time, and that the possibilities inherent in the 
design space have diminished. 
 
6. Manufacturers’ Entry and Investment 
The previous section showed that user innovation has its own organizational logic and 
dynamic pattern. Where does manufacturing fit into this picture? In this section, we explore the 
behavior of manufacturers with respect to a stream of user innovations. The exposition proceeds 
as follows. We begin by characterizing designs and manufacturing technologies along five 
dimensions. We then construct a model of user-purchaser demand and profit maximization by 
manufacturers. We use the model to show, first, how profit expectations affect a manufacturer’s 
decision to enter the market and second, how a market may be split between user-manufacturers 
and established manufacturers. 
  
Designs and Manufacturing Technologies 
Designs and the technologies employed to maufacture them differ on thousands of 
dimensions, but we will focus on just five, which we believe capture the first-order effects of 
user-generated innovation on industry structure. The five dimensions are: (1) innovation cost,  d ; 
(2) design quality,   a ; (3) user cost of ownership,  u ; (4) variable cost of production,   c; and (5) 
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capital cost,   C . The first three properties are important to users and user-innovators; the last two 
are important to manufacturers. Any set of designs and technologies can be categorized 
according to these five dimensions. Thus our model of manufacturers’ behavior in the presence of 
user innovation is general, although we will apply it to manufacturers of rodeo kayaks.   
As in the previous section, innovation costs,  d , are incurred when a user-innovator 
attempts to change a pre-existing design. Technologies differ in terms of the ease with which a 
new design prototype can be constructed or an existing design modified. For example, fiberglass 
hand lay-up is a low-innovation-cost (low  d) technology, and plastic injection molding is a high-
innovation-cost (high  d) technology. 
We have also already defined design quality,  a , as it is perceived by user-innovators. 
Designs that expert users deem to be “outstanding” have high  a ; those that experts consider to 
be inferior have low   a . We assume that user-purchasers and user-innovators perceive design 
quality in the same way: they agree on  a . 
User-purchasers also face differential user costs of ownership. Such costs take into account 
the time, effort and aggravation involved in purchasing, handling and maintaining the good. 
Designs that result in delicate, hard-to-handle, high-maintenance objects (like squirt boats) have 
high user costs of ownership, while those that result in robust, easy-to-handle, low-maintenance 
objects (like plastic boats) have low costs of ownership. We assume that users differ from one 
another in their perception of ownership costs. Specifically, we assume that (1) for the original 
user-innovator costs of ownership are zero; and (2) the cost differential between successive users 
is constant, denoted   u . Manufacturers then face a linear inverse demand curve: 
 
  p(N ) = a − uN    .        (5) 
 
That is, the price needed to sell   N  units of a good with design quality  a  is  a − uN . 
Variable costs,   c, are the per-unit cost of making an item, including materials, labor, 
marketing, transportation, administration, management. Capital costs,  C , are the upfront costs of 
making the item, including plant and equipment, inventory, trade credit, plus investments in 
branding, marketing, and process R&D.  Labor-intensive production technologies (like fiberglass 
hand lay-up) have high variable costs and low capital costs, while automated, machine-intensive 
technologies (like plastic injection molding) have low variable costs and high capital costs.  
  
Profit Maximization 
The first step in our analysis is to derive the profit-maximizing strategy of a monopolist. 
Under the assumptions stated above, a manufacturer facing no competition has the following 
profit function: 
 
Profits of             = p(N )N − cN    ;     (6) 
of a Monopolist 
 
where   p(N ) = a − uN . Standard optimization methods then give us the optimal price,   p *, units 
sold,   N *, and profits,   Π * of the firm: 
 
  
p * = a + c
2
= a − c
2
+ c ;       (7a) 
 
  
N * = a − c
2u
;        (7b) 
 
  
Π * = (a − c)
2
4u
        (7c) 
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Note that innovation cost (  d) and capital cost (  C) do not enter the expressions for 
optimal price, units sold and profit. By definition, the user-purchasers are not interested in 
changing the design of the good, and so  d  does not affect their demand. Capital costs affect a 
manufacturer’s decision to enter the market, but once it has entered, such costs are sunk, and do 
not affect pricing or production decisions. 
 
The Decision to Enter—Why User-Manufacturers Enter First 
In deciding whether to enter a given market, a manufacturer must compare the capital 
costs of his chosen technology to the present value of the stream of expected profits over the 
lifetime of the investment. Specifically, a manufacturer (who faces no competition) will calculate 
the net present value (NPV) of his business opportunity as follows: 
 
  
NPV = Π *
(1 + r)tt=1
T∑ − C
= (a − c)
2 / 4u
(1 + r)tt=1
T∑ − C
     (8) 
 
Equation (8) shows how the attractiveness of the investment opportunity depends on the 
profit stream,   Π * and the expected lifetime of the profit stream,  T . If the next successful user 
innovation will render the manufacturer’s capital obsolete, then the expected lifetime of the profit 
stream equals the expected interarrival time between successful designs. In section 5 and Appendix 
1, we showed that this interval increases over time as the design space gets mined out. This is 
where the behavior of user-innovators influences the behavior of manufacturers.  
In the early stages of user innovation, the expected interarrival time between successful 
designs, may be quite short. In that case, the only worthwhile investments have no (or very low) 
capital. (In equation (8), if   T  is low, the first term will be small, hence  C  must be small to obtain a 
positive NPV.) At this point in the industry’s development, user-manufacturers will have a 
threefold advantage over established manufacturers in other fields.  
First, user-innovators who become user-manufacturers already have product and process 
designs. In terms of our model, user-manufacturers have already paid the initial design cost,  d . 
Manufacturers from other fields must still pay this cost, which may be large or small depending 
on the context.   
Second, user-manufacturers are already in the community of users, hence they can use 
low-cost, word-of-mouth marketing techniques. This gives them a lower variable cost,   c, in 
relation to those who are not in the community. Again the advantage may be large or small, 
depending on the context.   
Third, because user-manufacturers can use their prototyping facilities to build products, 
they can be profitable from the outset, regardless of the actual level of demand or the interarrival 
time of successful new designs. In effect, in setting up prototyping facilities, user-innovators have 
already invested a small amount of capital in manufacturing. This sunk capital and the 
capabilities involved in managing it constitute a competitive advantage vis a vis other 
manufacturers seeking to enter the market de novo.  
What this means is that an established manufacturer who attempts to enter the new 
market using low-capital methods will be dominated by user-manfacturers on the   d,  c and   C  
dimensions of its technology.  That is a formidable disadvantage to overcome. At the same time, 
an established manufacturer who wants to use high-capital technology needs to be fairly certain 
that her profits will exceed some level and that the expected interarrival time between successful 
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new designs is long enough to justify the investment. In other words, the combination of   Π * and 
  T  in equation (8) must yield a positive NPV for the capital,  C , that the established manufacturer 
plans to spend. 
A good illustration of a low-capital user-manufacturer in the rodeo kayak field is Stefan 
Steffel.  Steffel was a member of the Austrian National Freestyle Kayak Team and participated in 
the 2003 World Championships. He started to develop kayak helmets in 2002 because he wanted 
a stylish and functional helmet for his own use.  Others who saw his novel helmets wanted their 
own, and so he began to produce helmets for sale to others. The production technology Steffel 
uses at the time of this writing is very simple and requires almost no capital.  He forms and 
bonds four thin layers of carbon fabric over a self-designed helmet form, and then adds fittings 
such as shock-absorbing padding. His production cost per helmet is around $30 plus 3 hours of 
his time. His tools and material  fit into two suitcases, so he can take his “factory” with him when 
he travels to rodeo kayaking events. In 2005 he expected to sell 60 to 70 helmets using these 
methods. 
  
 Capital-intensive Technologies—An Opportunity for Established Manufacturers 
Production and marketing methods that require little or no capital tend to have high 
variable costs. Thus once manufacturers know that a particular market exists and are confident 
that the next successful design will not arrive too soon, they have incentives to invest. Where will 
the capital investment come from?  One possibility is that the low-capital user-manufacturers 
already in the market will make the investments. Another possibility is that an established 
manufacturer from a nearby product market will enter the new market in competition with the 
incumbent user-manufacturers. This is most likely to occur if the original user-manufacturers 
lack the capabilities to implement high-volume production and marketing methods. 
What happens when a high-capital firm enters the market in competition with a low-
capital firm or firms? Possibly that firm will drive its predecessors out of the market. However, a 
more likely outcome is a shared market equilibrium as described in the next section. 
  
A Shared Market Equilibrium 
In this section we extend our model to show how a market may be split between a user-
manufacturer with an advanced design and an established manufacturer with a less advanced 
design and a low-variable-cost production technology. We then use the model to explain the 
evolution of the rodeo kayak industry as described in Section 2.  
Let Firm 1 be the user-manufacturer and Firm 2 be the established manufacturer. They 
sell differentiated goods (good 1 and good 2 respectively) and compete on price (Bertrand 
competition).  
Consistent with our previous arguments, we assume that the user-manufacturer has 
higher design quality and and uses high-variable-cost production methods, while the established 
manufacturer has lower design quality and uses low- cost methods. In other words, the user-
manufacturer’s products are aimed at an elite customer base, while the established 
manufacturer’s products are targeted at a mass market. These assumptions imply that:   a1 > a2  
and   c1 > c2 .  
The two goods also differ in the way individual users perceive their cost of ownership,  u . 
Specifically, the   N th  user is willing to pay for good 1 and good 2 as follows: 
 
  Good 1 :      WTP1(N ) = a1 − u1N  ; 
 
  Good 2 :      WTP2 (N ) = a2 − u2N  . 
 
Users with negative willingness to pay for a good will not purchase it. Consistent with the idea 
that good 2 is a mass market good, we assume that  a2 / u2 > a1/ u1 . This means that more users 
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derive positive utility from good 2 than good 1, and (because  a1 > a2 ) implies that   u1 > u2 . 
Formally the willingness-to-pay functions indicate that “low-  N ” users are willing to pay 
more for good 1 (the user-manufacturer’s product). These users perceive good 1’s design quality 
to be high and its costs of ownership for them are low. In contrast, “high-  N ” users are willing to 
pay more for good 2 (the established firm’s product). They concede that good 1’s design quality is 
high, but for them its costs of ownership are high—high enough to offset the design quality. Thus 
in our model goods differ in terms of their ownership costs,  design quality and cost of production, and 
users differ in the way ownership costs affect their willingness to pay. In other words, the goods are 
both vertically and horizontally differentiated.  
This characterization of users’ behavior arises directly from our field observations. We 
found that goods supplied by user-manufacturers were often difficult to buy, maintain or use, 
because user-manufacturers could not afford distribution systems, field service operations, or 
training centers, all of which require capital. We also found that some user-purchasers—those 
living far away, those who did not know how to maintain or repair the good, or those who were 
not experts—would not buy the user-manufacturer’s good for these reasons. But others would 
purchase it despite these difficulties. It is these differences between goods and among users that 
we model via the willingness-to-pay functions. (Such differences are succinctly captured in a 
comment often made about fiberglass kayaks: “Who wants to spend their weekends patching up 
boats?”)  
We follow standard practice and assume that, given a choice between two imperfect 
substitutes, each user calculates a “consumer surplus” for each good, i.e., the difference between 
his willingness to pay and the good’s price. He then buys the good with the higher consumer 
surplus, as long as it is greater than zero. (Thus in our model, user costs of ownership operate like 
transportation costs in a Hotelling spatial competition model—see Tirole, 1988, p. 277-279.2 
However, in contrast to many Hotelling-type models, we do not allow our firms to strategically 
choose their “locations.”) 
We now consider a non-cooperative pricing game between the two firms. The objective 
function of Firm   i , i = (1,2)  is: 
 
  
max
pi
Πi = (pi − ci ) Di (pi , pj )     ;      (9) 
 
where   j  denotes the other firm. The corresponding first order condition is: 
 
 
  
Di (pi , pj ) + (pi − ci )
∂ Di (pi , pj )
∂ pi = 0    ;     (10) 
 
To determine the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of this game (if one exists), we must specify the 
firms’ demand functions,   D1 and D2 ; solve the system of equations corresponding to the first 
order conditions; and check that the second order conditions are satisfied  (Tirole, 1988, p. 428). 
                                                          
2 To see this, consider a store located at the origin that sells two goods, which are imperfect substitutes. 
Good 1 is of higher quality, but more costly (per mile) to ship; good 2 is of lower quality, but cheaper (per 
mile) to ship. Users live at different distances from the store, and must pay the shipping cost. No user will 
buy more than one unit of one good. Under these assumptions, users who “live” close to the origin will 
purchase good 1; those who live farther away will purchase good 2; and those who live very far away will 
purchase neither. Users’ purchase behavior switches from good 1 to good 2 at the “point of indifference”, 
that is, the point where the   N th  user’s consumer surpluses for the two goods are equal. Similarly, users’ 
purchase behavior switches from good 2 to “no purchase” at the point where the  N th  user’s consumer 
surplus for good 2 equals zero. The switching points depend on the prices charged by each firm (see Figure 
2 below). 
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In Appendix 2 we show that, under our assumptions, the demand functions for Firms 1 
and 2 respectively are: 
 
  
D1(p1, p2 ) = (a1 − a2 ) − (p1 − p2 )u1 − u2
 ;     (11a) 
 
  
D2 (p1, p2 ) = a2 − p2u2
− (a1 − a2 ) − (p1 − p2 )
u1 − u2
 .    (11b) 
 
Substituting these demand functions and their partial derivatives into the first order conditions 
yields a linear system of two equations in two unknowns,  p1 and p2 . Checking the second order 
conditions confirms that the unique solution of this system is a Nash equilibrium. The 
equilibrium, if it exists, is summarized by the following equations: 
 
  
p1 = a1 + c12 −
a2 − p2
2
 ;      (12a) 
 
  
p2 = a2 + c22 −
a1 − p1
2(u1/ u2 )
 .      (12b) 
 
(For some parameter values, e.g.,   c1 > a1 , an equilibrium may not exist.) 
 
Figure 2: Market shared between a user-manufacturer of high-quality, elite 
products and an established manufacturer of low-quality, mass market 
products 
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Figure 2  depicts such an equilibrium. Firm 1 is the user-manufacturer and Firm 2 the 
established manufacturer, thus by assumption, the Firm 1’s willingness-to-pay function has a 
higher intercept and steeper slope and its variable cost is higher than Firm 2’s. In equilibrium, 
Firm 1 charges a relatively high price,  p1  and users to the left of the first vertical line   D1 
purchase this “elite” product. Firm 2 charges a lower price,  p2 , and users located between the 
vertical lines   D1  and   D1 + D2  buy this “mass market” product. At  D1, the consumer surpluses 
of the two goods are equal:   CS1(D1) = CS2 (D2 ) . Total units sold equal  D1 + D2 .  Firm 1’s profit, 
  (p1 − c1) ⋅ D1, is indicated by the square shaded area next to the vertical axis; Firm 2’s profit, 
  (p2 − c2 ) ⋅ D2 , by the rectangular shaded area between the vertical lines  D1  and   D1 + D2 . 
 
Market Evolution Resulting from a Series of User Innovations 
Precisely how the market will be shared depends on the relative values of the key 
parameters,   a,u and c . Depending on these parameters, the prices charged by the two 
competitors may be close together or far apart, and the market share of the user-manufacturer 
may be large or small. Furthermore, each time a successful user innovation arrives or a new 
production technology is invented, the parameter values will change, causing prices (and 
demands) to shift to a new equilibrium. 
We can use this model to explain the evolution of the rodeo kayak industry described in 
section 2. We begin in the late 1970s, when two established plastic boat manufacturers were 
already in the market. Recall that relative to fiberglass boats, plastic boats had lower user costs as 
well lower variable costs of production. But relative to the most advanced hulls, the plastic boats 
were of lower quality (experts could not do as many tricks with them). 
The first user-innovation challenge came in the form of fiberglass squirt boats. These had 
high design quality, but also very high user costs: they were delicate and hard to maintain and 
required expert handling. Because of their high user costs, the purchasers’ willingness-to-pay 
function for squirt boats would have had a very steep slope. It seems intuitive that squirt boats 
would have high prices and very low market shares. (Of course, it is necessary to solve the model 
for appropriate parameter values to confirm this intuition: we will do so below.) 
The second user-innovation challenge was a breakthrough design: the “best of both 
worlds” snub-nosed, planing hull design of the late 1980s. In reality, our dataset on innovations  
shows that the breakthrough was the result of steady, ongoing user experimentation and 
innovation in both techniques and equipment. The end result, however, was a design that was 
superior to squirt boats in terms of absolute design quality (experts could do more tricks with it) 
and much easier (for anyone) to handle. In terms of our model, the “center-buoyant” boats had 
both a higher   a  and a lower   u  than squirt boats. But while these designs were experimental, 
user-manufacturers sensibly relied on low capital, high variable cost fiberglass production 
methods. In terms of our model, the center-buoyant boats initially had approximately the same 
production cost,   c, as squirt boats.  
The third challenge was a manufacturing innovation made possible by prior user 
innovations. As the user-innovators began to converge on a “standard” center-buoyant design, 
some firms began to make the new hulls out of plastic. Plastic production methods brought down 
the variable cost of center-buoyant boats, and, because plastic is easier to maintain, user costs 
declined still further. 
We can use the shared equilibrium model to predict how the original plastic boats would 
fare against the challenges of this stream of user innovations. As a thought experiment, therefore, 
we chose parameter values for each type of boat that reflected what we knew about their relative 
design quality, user cost and variable cost. We then solved the model for three competitive 
confrontations, pitting the original plastic boats against (1) squirt boats; (2) fiberglass center-
buoyant boats; and (3) plastic center-buoyant boats. (These confrontations roughly represent the 
state of competition in the market during the following periods: (1) 1980-1985; (2) 1985-1995; and 
(3) 1995-present.)  
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The inputs to the thought experiment are summarized in table 2. Consistent with our 
previous discussion, we assume that, in terms of design quality, squirt boats hulls have higher 
design quality than the original plastic hull, and center-buoyant hulls are better still. The original 
plastic hulls have the lowest user cost, followed by center-buoyant plastic, center-buoyant 
fiberglass, and squirt boats. Finally, plastic hulls have much lower variable costs than fiberglass 
hulls (but we assume that center-buoyant plastic hulls are slightly more expensive to make than 
the original plastic hulls). 
 
Table 2: Inputs to the shared equilibrium model 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the outputs from the shared equilibrium model. Moving from left to right 
we see how user-generated innovations can migrate from a tiny niche to market dominance. The model 
tells us that two things have to happen for this migration to take place. First, the advanced user-
innovator designs have to become usable by large numbers of user-purchasers, that is   u  must 
fall. Second, mass production methods have to reduce the variable cost (  c) of making the 
advanced designs. Only then will their prices come down below most user-purchasers’ 
willingness-to-pay. Interestingly, however, the price of the more advanced designs does not need 
to be as low as the original mass-market product for the new designs to become dominant. In the 
last panel of table 3, the original plastic boats have prices less than half of center-buoyant boats, 
and yet the original boats’ market share and profits are very low. There is no mystery here: 
center-buoyant boats have (by assumption) twice the design quality and their user costs are 
comparable to original plastic boats. This means that most user-purchasers are willing to pay a 
substantial premium for a center-buoyant plastic boat. Only those with the highest user cost (or 
least ability to pay) will purchase an original plastic boat. 
 
Table 3: Output from the shared equilibrium model 
 
The Impact of a Breakthrough Design 
If we focus on the first and second panels of table 3, we can see how a “breakthrough” 
design, defined as one that combines high design quality (  a) with low user cost (  u ), dramatically 
changes entry incentives for user-manufacturers. In comparison with squirt boats, revenue from 
Center- Center-
Original Squirt Buoyant Buoyant
Inputs Plastic Boat Fiberglass Plastic
a (design quality) 1000 1500 2000 2000
u (user cost) 0.05 0.5 0.2 0.1
c (variable cost) 200 800 800 220
Center- Center-
Original  vs. Squirt Original vs. Buoyant Original vs. Buoyant
Outputs Plastic Boat Plastic Fiberglass Plastic Plastic
Price 572 936 493 1,147 289 754
Units Sold 8,262 302 7,822 2,311 3,543 10,686
Profit ($000) 3,072 41 2,295 801 314 5,709
Gross Margin (%) 65% 15% 59% 30% 31% 71%
Market Share (units) 96.47% 3.53% 77.19% 22.81% 24.90% 75.10%
Market Share (revenue) 94.36% 5.64% 59.29% 40.71% 11.26% 88.74%
Total Units Sold (Np + Ns)     8,564 10,133 14,229
Total Revenue ($000) 5,007 6,509 9,082
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center-buoyant fiberglass hulls is almost ten times higher and profits almost twenty time higher! 
Thus a “breakthrough” design originating in a user-innovator community creates opportunities 
for new user-manufacturers to enter the market. Indeed each successful new design following the 
breakthrough creates another opportunity for entry. And because user-manufacturers use low-
capital methods, they can enter profitably even when the designs are turning over rapidly, ie., the 
expected interarrival time between successful designs,  T , is very short. In contrast, 
manufacturers using high-capital methods must be assured that  T  is long enough to allow them 
to recoup their capital.  
Combining the results of sections 5 and 6, our theory predicts that, following the 
discovery of a breakthrough design (high  a , low  u ), there will be a rash of startups by user-
manufacturers using low capital technology. Such entry will continue, albeit at a diminishing rate 
until the design space of the breakthrough is mined out.  
To test this prediction, we looked at entry by new firms into the rodeo kayak market 
following the advent of center-buoyant, planing hull designs in the late 1980s. Between 1986 and 
2003, at least fifteen new firms entered the rodeo kayaking industry worldwide. Of these, twelve 
were user-manufacturers by our definition; one was a new business unit of a corporate parent; 
and two had founders whose relationship to the sport was indeterminate.3  
Fiberglass technology provided a platform for user innovation through the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, and allowed user-manufacturers to form new firms with little or no initial capital 
investment. However, today all surviving manufacturers in our sample offer plastic boats for 
sale. (There may be firms too small to be in our sample, but we have accounted for all firms with 
any presence on the worldwide web, and all firms that have entered boats in the world 
competitions since 1993. Interestingly, 1993 was the last year in which a homemade boat, i.e., a 
pure user innovation, placed in world competition.)  
The fact that all manufacturers now make plastic boats raises the question, can fiberglass 
center-buoyant boats compete with plastic center-buoyant boats? Using our model, the question 
can be made more general: when can firms specializing in advanced, experimental designs with 
low usability and high costs of production survive in a shared market equilibrium? To answer 
this question, we can look back at figure 2 and the first panel of table 3 (original plastic vs. squirt 
boats). Here we see that as long as the experimental designs have higher design quality for some 
users-purchasers, then an advanced, experimental sector, perhaps fueled by user innovation, will 
survive. High-cost experimental designs will support low-capital manufacturing until the design 
space is mined out. Thus, again combining results from sections 5 and 6, our theory predicts that 
user innovation and the high-cost experimental sector of an industry will decline at 
approximately the same rate. 
 
When a design space is mined out, then what? 
When user innovation ceases, does that mean that all innovation will stop? Not at all. 
First of all, firms have incentives to search for innovations that user-innovators will be indifferent 
to. User innovators, by definition, search for innovations they can use themselves. The number of 
other users who benefit from the innovation does not matter to them. But a firm can aggregate 
                                                          
3 To arrive at these figures, we began with the companies listed in Hienerth (2004) that made whitewater 
kayaks. (We included only boat manufacturers, excluding companies that made kayak gear or supplied 
ancillary services.) We augmented the list via a snowball search of retailer websites. We visited the website 
of each company, searching for descriptions of the company’s founders and a founding date. Not every 
company revealed the exact year of its founding, but most gave some clue, for example “we are a new 
company,” or “in business for ten years.” Obviously this method will miss companies that went into 
business and then failed, and companies with no websites: thus we know only that “at least fifteen” 
companies were founded in the time interval. The relative percentages of user-manufacturers, 
manufacturers, and “indeterminate” in the surviving set will be representative of the initial set as long as 
failure rates do not systematically differ across the three subgroups. 
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small increases in willingness-to-pay (or decreases in cost) over many users (von Hippel 2005). 
Thus some design searches—those that are expected to deliver modest benefit to a large number 
of users—will be attractive to firms, even after user-innovators consider the possibilities of the 
design space to be exhausted. 
Second, innovations that change the cost of generating (and testing) new designs—the 
cost we have labeled “  d”—will change user innovators’ incentives. If  d  goes down, users who 
previously had no incentive to search, may begin to search again. There are in turn two basic 
ways to change   d . The first involves modularization; the second involves creating a toolkit.  
A modular design architecture splits up the work of innovation into a set of smaller task 
modules. Modularizations often increase the option value of a set of design spaces, thereby 
increasing everyone’s incentives to search (Baldwin and Clark 2000). But modularity has another 
important effect on user-innovators: different people can devote their effort to different parts of 
the system, yet gain the benefit of the whole (Baldwin and Clark 2006b). Thus, given a modular 
architecture, design projects that a single person would not tackle alone may be undertaken by a 
community of user-innovators. (This result, like many others, arises because of the non-rival 
property of designs.) 
 Toolkits also depend on modularity, but in a different way. In essence a toolkit splits the 
tasks of design into those that are common and repetitive and those that are uncommon or 
unique. The common and redundant tasks are automated. In terms of our model, a toolkit splits 
the design cost,   d , into a capital component—the toolkit and the knowledge necessary to use it—
and a variable component—the designer’s decisions within the framework of the toolkit. By 
investing in the toolkit, a designer can reduce the time and effort needed to generate new 
designs. By the analysis of section 5, a reduction in a user-innovator’s design cost,   di , results in 
an increase that person’s threshold,  ai *, and possibly the community threshold,   ′ ′ a . Thus the 
introduction of a toolkit can rejuvenate user innovation in a design space that was previously 
deemed to be exhausted.  
 
7. Discussion 
Our theory and models indicate that industries built upon user innovation will evolve as 
follows. First, one or more users of some good recognize a new set of design possibilities– a so-
called “design space” –and begin to explore it. Users will then search in the design space to 
obtain the direct use value of their discoveries. Against the expected value of a new design they 
offset the cost of their own time, effort and out-of-pocket expenses. They benefit by freely 
revealing their designs in a community of like-minded innovators. At some point in this process, 
user-purchasers will emerge, interested in buying copies of user innovations rather than making 
them for themselves.  In response, some user-innovators may become user-manufacturers, using 
high-variable-cost, low-capital methods to satisfy the demands of fellow community members.  
Later, as the no-longer-new design space begins to be “mined out”, better solutions 
become harder to find and the rate of user innovation slows.  As a result, investments in 
manufacturing methods involving higher capital costs and lower variable costs become feasible.  
User-manufacturers or others respond by making such investments and lower-cost products will 
increase the size of the market.  User-innovators who require the very best performance continue 
to innovate, however, and also continue to sell smaller numbers of high-performance products to 
user-purchasers who are willing to pay for advanced designs. But progressive mining out of the 
design space leads to steadily lower rates of user innovation, less entry, and eventually to the 
collapse of the user-driven experimental sector of the industry. 
Our model of design search indicates that there are large benefits to having a free-
revealing community. Any scale of community is more efficient than design search by innovators 
acting in isolation. Search efficiency goes up as the size of the community goes up or as free 
revealing occurs among multiple communities.  However, the benefits of community hinge on 
the non-rival property of designs. Rivalry in innovation can be introduced via competition 
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among firms or by organized competition in the form of games or tournaments. If there is "too 
much" competition of either type, the community form of organization will not be viable. 
The events described in our model of industry evolution do not have to happen in a strict 
order. Also in some cases, one or more of the steps we describe might be left out.  In the case of 
rodeo kayaking, for example, recall that the production of squirt boats never shifted from a low-
capital / high variable cost regime to a high-capital / low-variable cost regime.  Although squirt 
boats represented an important stage in the user development of rodeo kayaks, this particular 
type of boat was difficult for non-experts to use.  Also, each individual boat produced had to be 
tailored to the body weight of its owner.  For both reasons, there was not enough demand for a 
standard design to justify making high fixed-cost investments in the production of a specific 
squirt boat model.  
 
Generality of the models 
We think our models (of design search and industry evolution) may be quite generally 
applicable to fields and industries where users are an important source of innovation, and where 
design spaces are finite and so subject to being mined out.  To test this possibility, we next subject 
the models to several thought experiments.  Each involves varying a basic condition or 
assumption in one or both of the models. 
First, in our model of industry evolution, the transition from a low-capital/high-variable 
cost manufacturing regime to a high-capital/low-variable cost one occurs as a design space is 
mined out and the pace of user innovation slows as a consequence .  What if there is no fixed 
design space and so no mining out?  Design spaces can be expanded via the creativity of 
designers supported by the consensus of users that the expansion is “a good idea.” Indeed, we 
saw a minor example of design space expansion in our rodeo kayaking test case:  the inclusion of 
standing waves as well as “holes” in rodeo kayaking competitions starting in 1999. Expanding an 
existing design space is equivalent to opening up a new design space (albeit perhaps a small one). 
Our model of design search predicts that this should result in a temporary increase in the rate of 
user innovation. And in fact, our data show that the pace of rodeo kayaking technique and 
equipment innovation quickened for a period before leveling off (see figure 1). 
However, some products and markets appear to have design spaces that are relatively 
easy to expand. (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, call such expansion “augmentation.”)  Personal digital 
assistants and cell phones are examples of this.  Their functionalities have evolved in a relatively 
unfettered way – for example, cell phone functionality recently expanded to include cameras.   
Our model of design search does not apply to such cases, although it might be extended in that 
direction.  But it is clear that, absent a fixed design space with a stationary distribution of 
opportunities, the mining out predicted by our model will not occur. In that case, the rate of user 
innovation will not necessarily decline over time, and low-capital, experimental user-
manufacturers and high-capital, mainstream manufacturers might coexist indefinitely.  
Second, what happens if the design-specific investments assumed in our model of 
industry evolution are not required to get the variable costs of production and distribution down?  
For example, so called “mass-customized” production methods are based on computer-driven 
production tools that can be automatically adjusted to produce single units of unique products at 
variable costs similar to those achievable by fixed, design-specific production tooling (Pine 1993).  
To the extent that such production methods are available to user-manufacturers (for example 
through outsourcing as in the fabless semiconductor market or assembly stage of computers), it 
seems to us that small-scale user-manufacturers could move more seamlessly into higher volume 
production as their markets grew. In such cases, it will be harder for new entrants to use capital 
investment to dislodge user-manufacturers who have secured an early position in an emerging 
market. 
 Third, what happens if users can innovate by modifying products that manufacturers 
produce via high-capital/low-variable cost methods?  Recall that in our rodeo kayaking case this 
was not the situation: it was technically difficult for rodeo kayak user-innovators to modify mass-
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produced plastic kayaks to incorporate their new design ideas, and so they were forced to build 
their prototypes “from scratch” from fiberglass, using high-variable-cost hand fabrication 
methods.  Often, however, mass produced products do serve as convenient platforms for user-
innovators.  For example, most user-innovators who develop improvements to their “street” 
vehicles start with an existing car – a “tuner car” - and build modifications onto it that rather than 
starting from scratch. In such cases, we would still see a transition from low-capital to high-
capital production methods in some stages of the supply chain, as predicted in our model.  But 
other manufacturers, following the tracks of the user-innovators, might specialize in modifying 
the low-cost mass-produced product.  We can see this pattern for example, in the number of 
aftermarket firms, some quite large, that sell modifications to standard cars produced by major 
auto manufacturers.  The auto aftermarket is estimated to be $29 billion in 2005 (Vasilash 2005).  
Fourth, what happens if manufacturers are not required for the production of a product, 
as in the case of information products?  A set of commercial firms may still emerge focused on 
diffusion and design transfer.  Specifically, in our model, "manufacturers" have two roles. They 
physically make multiple copies of a given design (production) and they transfer new designs to 
users who don't want to design themselves.  Conceptually, these two roles can be separated. For 
example, information goods have designs that can be copied very cheaply, using generic 
electronic technologies. Once an information good has been converted into a digital format, it 
doesn't require specialized physical or chemical processes to be "manufactured." So one of the 
two roles we have assigned to manufacturers disappears. The "design transfer" role may still 
remain, however, in which case, we will see firms emerge whose function is to sort, collate, 
evaluate and transfer designs between users. 
As an illustration, for a significant period of time, open source software products such as 
the Linux operating system and Apache web server software were developed, distributed and 
supported in the field only by their user communities – no manufacturer was required.  Users 
innovated and shared their innovations in an “experimental” version of the software. 
Community core members then selected the features that would be included in the “standard 
release,” which was distributed to users who valued consistency, stability and dependability.  As 
the number of users of the standard releases grew, however, commercial suppliers such as Red 
Hat found it profitable to create even more user-friendly packaged releases. In terms of our 
model, Red Hat is in the design transfer role vis a vis Linux. 
Finally, what happens if being a user-manufacturer is not an attractive proposition?  In our 
model, user-manufacturers are the first producers of user innovations because they are assumed 
to have lower costs than “outside” manufacturers in the early, low volume stages of a market. 
More specifically, users who become low-volume manufacturers have better information about 
user needs and lower design and marketing costs  than “outside” manufacturing firms. However, 
sometimes there can be offsetting regulatory or other costs for user-innovators.  In such cases, the 
user-manufacturer stage of our model may be skipped and “outside” firms may be the first to 
manufacture user innovations.   
 
Relationship to “dominant design” and other theories of industry evolution 
Recall from the literature review that our focus on users as the primary innovators raises 
subsidiary sets of questions related to industrial organization and industry evolution. First, how 
will the user-innovators organize themselves? Specifically, what social configurations will allow 
them to pursue and diffuse innovations efficiently? Second, how will the industry evolve over 
time?  What types of firms will enter, and when?  Third, is the concept of “dominant design” 
useful in these settings?  And will there be a switch to process innovation, and “evolution toward 
concentration” as Abernathy and Utterback and Klepper suggest?  
We have addressed the first two sets of questions in our models and case-related 
discussions.   We have argued that users will organize themselves into free revealing 
communities, and that, often, user-manufacturers will enter first.  If they do, established 
manufacturers may have an opportunity to enter by investing in high-capital processes. 
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Technically the user-manufacturers have the same opportunity, but they may lack capital or 
requisite capabilities.  Entry by high-capital firms will not necessarily drive low-capital firms out 
of the market. A shared market equilibrium may result.  A "breakthrough" design is one that 
greatly increases the usability of a set of advanced designs. Breakthroughs create a lot of demand, 
first in the low-capital sector, then in the high-capital sector. There will be a "flurry" (or perhaps a 
blizzard) of entry by user-manufacturers, followed by a wave of investment in high-capital 
processes.  And a breakthrough design may drive high-capital incumbents out of the market, 
unless they can make the transition to the new designs. 
 What does our model say about the concept of dominant designs?  In rodeo-kayaking, 
products have now converged on a standard center-buoyant, planing hull design. Utterback and 
Abernathy predict that this event will be followed by a shakeout of firms, as production becomes 
more concentrated.  We find that, to the contrary, the first effect of the development of that 
breakthrough design was to stimulate a lot of entry by new firms that experimented with variants 
of the "operational principle" of the breakthrough.  Our model predicts that industry 
concentration will really take hold only after the design space is mined out. On that view, the last 
successful new design, not the breakthrough, corresponds to the dominant design.  As Murmann 
and Frenken (2005) point out, on a long enough time scale, all designs from the "breakthrough" to 
the "last success" may look like variants on one design. But a great deal of design history and 
industry turbulence may occur in the time between breakthrough and last success!   
Will there be a switch to process innovation, and “evolution toward concentration” as 
Utterback and Abernathy and Klepper suggest?  Yes. Opportunities for process innovation open 
up as soon as the existence of the market is established. However, these opportunities 
consistently get more valuable as   T , the expected interarrival time of successful new user-
developed designs, increases. Thus the mix of search effort will be changing over time—user 
innovation (which is by definition, product innovation) will go down over time, and process 
innovation will go up as   T  gets longer, making process investments more valuable.  Eventually,  
according to our model, all user innovation will stop, and  T  will be at its maximum. In that state, 
most innovation will be process innovation. And if the process investments have the 
characteristics of sunk-cost capital (as defined by Sutton 1991),  then the ending market structure 
will be highly concentrated and oligopolistic. 
 
Managerial Implications 
Manufacturers do not yet tend to look systematically at the new product opportunities 
that user innovations, user innovation communities and related emerging markets represent. The 
model we have presented here provides a first opportunity for both user-manufacturers and 
established manufacturers to think systematically about the dynamics of these types of markets, 
and to plan their business strategies accordingly.  
User-manufacturers will be interested to understand that they often have comparative 
advantages over established manufacturers during the early stages of user exploration of a new 
design space.  It is important for them to understand the nature of these advantages and how and 
why they diminish over time. If user-manufacturers wish to continue to compete in the major 
portion of their market as it matures, they must also acquire the advantages of established 
manufacturers, such as access to high-capital production processes, established distribution 
channels, and well-known brands.  They can also elect to continue their role as early, niche 
manufacturers of leading-edge products.  As long as user-innovators are actively searching in the 
design space, the low-capital, experimental sector of the industry will continue to be viable. 
When user innovation stops, however, this low-capital sector will disappear. 
Established manufacturers wishing to apply production and distribution methods 
requiring high model-specific capital investments to an emerging market must pay close 
attention to   T , the interarrival time of successful new designs.  As our model shows, the arrival 
of new user-developed designs can obsolete design-specific investments made by manufacturers.  
Therefore, manufacturers should postpone their entry into the market until  T  and model-specific 
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market volumes have reached levels that justify their investments (see equation 8).  (User 
manufacturers using low-capital technologies, in contrast, can flourish under conditions of low 
  T .)  Surviving manufacturers will still search for new designs.  However, their incentives are to 
look for innovations of modest value that can be applied to many units. Cost-reducing process 
innovations and widely valued new features are two examples of this type of innovation. 
  
Opportunities for further research  
There are clear opportunities for further research both with respect to model 
development and empirical research.  In the first place, while the theory and models we have 
presented are quite general, they have some clear limitations. There are several interesting 
avenues that invite exploration. For example, on the design search modeling “track”, it would be 
interesting to look at the impact of organized competition on innovation and free revealing in 
user communities. On the one hand, tournaments are known to increase investment in activities 
that contribute to winning (Frank and Cook 1995, Aoki 2001). On the other hand, rivalry between 
user-innovators creates disincentives to free reveal, and thus may attenuate the benefits of 
communities. This inherent tension calls for a model, as well as further empirical work to 
investigate how the tension is dealt with in different settings. On the manufacturing “track”, one 
obvious limitation of our model is that it deals with only two firms and one dimension of user 
and product heterogeneity (usability). A more realistic model would allow for multiple firms and 
several dimensions of heterogeneity.  
 New case studies focused on different industry and innovation conditions would also 
certainly enrich our understanding of the pathways traversed from user innovations to 
commercial products and enhance future theory and model development.  For example, the 
particular case explored here—rodeo kayaking—involves a tightly defined “legitimate” design 
space.  In effect, the worldwide community of rodeo kayakers has a tacit, but strong, shared 
understanding of their sport. They also have a collective interest in being able to compete and to 
compare their performances within a clear, commonly understood framework: introduction of a 
flying kayak into a rodeo kayaking contest would probably not be welcomed.  
 As indicated above, many products and markets, for example, cell phones and personal 
digital assistants, have design spaces that are more open and expandable—that is, freer to evolve 
new functionalities.  Few would disallow a convenient addition to a cell phone because “cell 
phones aren’t supposed to do that.”  In such cases, the model of design search developed here 
will not hold. The overall rate of user innovation will not decline over time—it may even increase 
in response to modularizations or the addition of especially rich new design subspaces. And if 
the rate of user innovation remains high, our model of industry evolution indicates that low-
capital, experimental user-manufacturers and high-capital, mass-market manufacturers might 
coexist indefinitely (although we expect there would be turnover in both as the underlying 
designs changed). Under these conditions we speculate that high-capital manufacturers may set 
their sights more finely,  seeking temporary “islands of stability” within a shifting product and 
market landscape, and making design-specific investments in production capabilities at those 
locations.  Studies of such cases  are clearly needed to build the basis for a still broader 
understanding of the pathways traversed as user innovations are transformed into commercial 
products.   
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Appendix 1 
The expected interarrival time between successful new designs 
 
Proposition. The expected interarrival time between successful new designs, denoted  T , is 
increasing in   ′ a , the quality of the best pre-existing design, and decreasing in   k , the number of 
independent design searches. 
 
Proof. Let   p ′ a ≡ Pr( X ≤ ′ a ) , that is, the probability that a given search will fail to uncover a 
design better than the best pre-existing design. Note that  p ′ a  increases with  ′ a : the better the pre-
existing standard, the higher the probability that it will not be bested.  
 
The expected interarrival time of the next successful design is then: 
 
  
T ( ′ a , k) = t [p ′ a k(t −1)
t =1
∞∑ (1 − p ′ a k )]    . 
 
This expression is an expectation, a sum of outcomes weighted by probabilities [in brackets]. The 
probabilities refer to the event that (1) no experiment has produced a successful design for   t −1 
periods and (2) one (or more) experiments produces a successful design in period   t . Naturally the 
probability weights sum to one. 
 
Call the bracketed expression  P  (for probability weight). The partial derivative of   P  with 
respect to   ′ a  is: 
 
  
∂P
∂ ′ a = kp ′ a 
k(t −1) t(p−k −1) − p−k[ ]dp ′ a d ′ a     . 
 
The first term is postive, and we have said that  dp ′ a / d ′ a  is positive. The term in brackets is 
negative for small   t , and positive (and increasing in  t ) for large  t . Thus increasing   ′ a  has the 
effect of decreasing the probability weights on small  t s (short interarrival times) and increasing 
the weights on large   t s (long interarrival times). As a result, holding  k  fixed,   T ( ′ a , k)  grows as  ′ a  
increases. 
 
Following the same logic, the partial derivative of  P  with respect to  k  is: 
 
  
∂P
∂k = p ′ a 
kt ln p ′ a t(p−k −1) − p−k[ ]    . 
 
Because   p ′ a < 1 ,   ln p ′ a < 0 , and the first term is negative. The term in brackets is the same as in the 
previous expression: it is negative for small  t , and positive (and increasing in   t ) for large   t . Thus 
increasing   k  has the effect of increasing the probability weights on short interarrival times and 
decreasing the weights on long interarrival times. Holding  ′ a  fixed,  T ( ′ a , k)  becomes shorter as  k  
increases. QED. 
 
     
 31 
Appendix 2 
Demand functions for Firms 1 and 2 and the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium 
 
Demand for good 1 
Proposition 1. In a shared market equilibrium, Firm 1’s demand function is: 
  
D1(p1, p2 ) = (a1 − a2 ) − (p1 − p2 )u1 − u2
      (11a) 
 
Proof. The consumer surpluses of good 1 and good 2 at a given point,   N , are equal if: 
  a1 − u1N − p1 = a2 − u2N − p2    .       
 
This equation has a unique solution, denoted  N *: 
 
  
N * = (a1 − a2 ) − (p1 − p2 )
u1 − u2
 
 
For   N < N *, good 1, which has the steeper (negative) slope, will be preferred. For   N > N *, good 
2 will be preferred. As long as   N *> 0 , users for whom  N ∈ (0,N *) will purchase good 1. Thus 
  D1(p1, p2 ) = N *. QED 
 
Demand for good 2 
Proposition 2. Firm 2’s demand function is: 
 
  
D2 (p1, p2 ) = a2 − p2u2
− (a1 − a2 ) − (p1 − p2 )
u1 − u2
     .    (11b) 
 
Proof. By the argument in Proposition 1, users for whom  N < N * will purchase good 1 
and those for whom   N > N * will purchase good 2 or nothing. Setting the consumer surplus of 
good 2 equal to zero and solving for the point of indifference, we have: 
 
 
  
N ** = a2 − p2
u2
    . 
 
As long as   N * < N **, users for whom  N ∈ (N *,N **) will purchase good 2. Thus 
  D2 (p1, p2 ) = N **− N *. QED 
 
Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium 
Substituting the demand functions and their partial derivatives into the first order 
conditions (equation 10 in the text), we obtain: 
 
  
FOC 1 : ∂Π1∂p1 =
(a1 − a2 ) − (p1 − p2 )
u1 − u2
+ (p1 − c1) −1(u1 − u2 )
= 0    ;    
 
  
FOC 2 : ∂Π2∂p2 =  
a2 − p2
u2
− (a1 − a2 ) − (p1 − p2 )
u1 − u2
− (p2 − c2 ) ⋅ − 1u2
− 1
u1 − u2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ = 0 .  
 
This is a linear system of two equations in two unknowns (  p1 and p2 ), thus it has a 
unique solution (unless the two equations are linearly dependent, which they are not in our case). 
In FOC 1,the signs of all terms containing  p1are negative. In FOC 2, the signs of all terms 
containing   p2  are negative. Thus   ∂2Πi / ∂pi2 < 0 , and the solution is a Nash equilibrium.  
